THE controversy over Nato/US aerial strikes within Pakistani territory refuses to go away. Just when drones seemed to be becoming a stale issue for the media, their frequency has significantly increased. Tensions over Nato-manned helicopter strikes in the past weeks have initiated a fresh debate altogether about Nato`s tactics.

For the most part, when drones are discussed, the issue of Pakistani sovereignty lies at the centre of the debate. The concern about the precision of these platforms and the collateral damage they cause is also part of the mix.

These issues are important and must be debated. Yet, by casting a purely legalistic and tactical lens on the controversy, one misses out on the much more fundamental issue: what is the strategic reasoning behind the drones? An understanding as to why these platforms are being used in the first place points to something much more critical to the Pakistan-US relationship.

The analysis quickly leads to a worrisome conclusion: the use of drones is a function of a fundamental disconnect between the end-goals Pakistan and the US are pursuing in the current fight against terrorism. If we are to believe US and Pakistani official statements that a near-perfect synergy in tactics and strategies between the two militaries is required to see the campaign against terror through successfully, this conclusion makes for a sombre reading.

Let me explain this conclusion.

From the US perspective, the drones came on line as a means to take the lead on aspects of the anti-militant strategy where Pakistan did not see eye-to-eye with the US or could not be trusted completely. The drone strikes were not part of the original plan when the US intervened in Afghanistan. It was only over time as the divergence in outlook, and in turn, the reluctance to play to the other`s tune became clear to both parties that the US considered taking unilateral action.

In reality, it would much rather have had the Pakistan military directly tackle those being targeted by the drones, i.e. Al Qaeda and other Afghan groups attacking coalition forces across the Durand Line. But both sides were cognisant that their principal enemies were different and that the other side did not have the incentive to go after the partner`s targets sincerely. Pakistan therefore could not be entrusted with tackling the presence of the Afghan groups on its own.

The Musharraf government agreed to allow the strikes. Its acceptance highlighted that Pakistan never saw the anti-militant effort against groups operating in Afghanistan as one where it needed to take the front seat. Instead, it was much more comfortable allowing the US to take charge of dealing with Afghanistan-specific threats even at the expense of a breach of its territorial sovereignty and an inevitable popular backlash. By the same token, the US, despite Pakistani requests, dragged its feet on attacking the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan with drones until it was convinced the group was a direct threat to it.

During the PPP government`s tenure, the US reliance on the drones has been even greater. Proponents of the strategy look at this as a positive; they point to the key successes from the strikes and the declining collateral damage. While the gains are commendable, this is a tactical view. It ignores the fact that greater reliance on drones implies even less faith in the Pakistani security establishment (which has already refused to oblige US demands in this regard) to target groups in Fata — the Haqqani network for example — operating against coalition forces. And thus, it is a sign of the two sides pulling further apart, not succeeding together.

Washington`s stance on Pakistan`s constant requests to transfer control of the drones to its military further reinforces this view. As one would expect, the request has found few sympathetic ears. By definition it is a non-starter in light of the premise laid out here: why would the US consider transferring control when the very logic of the strikes is to take on groups Pakistan has been reluctant to?

The very same argument can be extended to explain why the US has shied away from fulfilling constant Pakistani demands to enhance its hardware capacity needed to tackle militancy: the mutual mistrust implies that the US is not sure where this hardware will be employed. And if Pakistan is not going to use it to target anti-US groups on its soil, the US is less interested — another example of divergent priorities and policies.

The Nato helicopter strikes in the past weeks follow the same logic. They represent the latest move aimed at achieving military goals unilaterally. Since Nato commanders believe that elements within Pakistan must be targeted for the troop surge in Afghanistan to succeed and given that the Pakistani establishment has refused to do so itself, there is willingness to attempt unilateral measures even at the cost of annoying the Pakistani establishment and people afresh.

The use of aerial platforms in Pakistani territory is just one example of a major anomaly in the Pakistan-Nato/US relationship: the failure of the two sides to develop complete synergy in their outlook and policy in the campaign against terrorism. Both continue to see different centres of gravity for the problem and are thus comfortable with passing the burden on if the threat is perceived as only affecting the `other`. By any stretch of the imagination, this situation is sub-optimal from a strategic viewpoint.

If Pakistani and American strategic visions have to be fully aligned to attain victory in this war, as they claim, then there is hardly any positive to be drawn from a better and more efficient use of aerial platforms under the current circumstances. The problem is much deeper.

Granted, aligning their strategic outlook is a monumental challenge and requires a recasting of the end objectives as well as the incentive structures created to achieve them. Yet, merely scratching the surface will not deliver the results. So let us stop shying away from the blatant truth: for nine years, Pakistan and the US have not fought a common enemy. We need to determine how to correct this. Else, let us brace for the inevitable: an embarrassing end to this partnership.